Abstract-Electric Network Frequency (ENF) signals are the signatures of power systems that are either directly recorded from the power outlets or extracted from multimedia recordings near the electrical activities. Variations of ENF signals collected at different locations possess local environmental characteristics, which can be used as a potential fingerprint for authenticating measurements' source information. Within this paper is proposed a computational intelligence-based framework to recognize the source locations of power ENF signals within a distribution network in the US. To be more specific, a set of informative location-sensitive signatures from ENF measurements are initially extract with such measurements representative of local grid characteristics. Then these distinctive location-dependent signatures are further fed into a data mining algorithm yielding the "source-of-origin" of ENF measurements. Experimental results using ENF data at multiple intra-grid locations have validated the proposed methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric network frequency (ENF) signals refer to the instantaneous frequency of a distribution system, fluctuating around its nominal values (60Hz in North America or 50Hz in most other parts of the world) [1] . Variation in ENF signals is mainly determined by the mismatch between the power generation and load consumption of the power grid over a certain time period and it possesses location-sensitive information, which can be treated as a potential fingerprint for ENF source location identification [2] [3] and audio-video recording authentication [4] [5] .
ENF signals can be directly captured from power outlets using synchrophasor measurement. The ENF traces embedded in such synchrophasor measurement are usually considered as clean signals due to its high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which enables them a desirable reference for the ENF data pool [1, [6] [7] . Other methods for capturing ENF variation mainly involve signal processing and conditioning to extract ENF traces from multimedia recordings made in areas near the electrical activities [1, 7] . It has demonstrated that the ENF variation captured from video-audio recordings and power source are well matched once they are recorded simultaneously and within the same power grid [8] [9] .
The similarity among ENF signals extracted from different types of recordings has motivated a variety of ENF-based forensics applications, of particular note to recent research activities is to use ENF traces to recognize ENF recordings' source information. It is assumed certain difference resides in the fluctuations of ENF signals across different locations at a given time, making the locations of recordings distinguishable. Although previous studies have demonstrated successful recognition of source locations for the ENF signals extracted from electrical power grids [6, 10] and media recordings [3] , most ENF measurements are captured at limited sparse locations across relatively broad geographical areas, for example, from different power grids or multiple countries. For ENF signals within an interconnected grid, existing research presumes that there are no significant differences in the measured ENF traces. Research on ENF source identification at small geographical scale, such as multiple intra-grid locations, has been rarely reported. Therefore, it is still unclear regarding the limitation of the geographical resolution for ENF source identification.
To overcome the above difficulties in ENF source location identification, we have approached this problem by recognizing the source information of measured ENF traces from multiple locations within a distribution network through a pattern recognition framework. The findings of the study can answer the key question with respect to ENF source authentication, i.e., whether ENF signals within an interconnection embrace location-sensitive signatures, which can be further exploited towards building ENF localization strategies.
II. INVESTIGATED ENF SIGNAL DATASET
We have collected ENF signals from FNET/GridEye for our source authentication experiment. FNET/GridEye is a pilot wide area frequency monitoring system with high accuracy (±0.005° phase angle accuracy) mainly deployed at the distribution level of a power grid [11] [12] [13] . To collect GPSsynchronized phasor measurement, a large number of easily installed distribution-level phasor measurement units (PMUs) are connected to the single-phase 120-V electrical outlets at different locations. For now, there are more than 300 PMUs installed in major North American power grids, by which frequency, voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle are continuously measured to provide real time awareness of power system situations. Over the last two decades, a large amount of phasor measurements data regarding system's behaviours and operations have been archived by the FNET/GridEye servers hosted at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (UTK), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which is shown in Fig. 1 . In this study, we have retrieved ENF signals from 12 cities (W1-W10 plus ORL1 and ORL2) within the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) interconnection in the U.S (shown in Fig. 2 ). For each location, a series of data windows with 10 minutes window width are used to separate the time series ENF signals into a number of non-overlapping frames. All measured ENF signals have 10Hz reporting rate. We have randomly selected 1,000 ENF traces for each city during the summer peak season in 2017. To minimize the impacts of the system operation reschedules and grid topology changes on the source authentication, the selected traces were recorded within the same time period among the above 12 venues. 
III. ENF DATA AUTHENTICATION APPROACH
This session elaborates the described ENF signal source authentication framework, which contains three major steps: (1) Informative location-sensitive signatures regarding local grid condition variations are extracted from ENF measurements at multiple locations by using a variety of advanced signals processing techniques; (2) The extracted signatures are used to train the random forest classification (RFC) algorithm [14] to learn the underlying relationship between the informative features and each measurement location; (3) The above trained RFC algorithm is subsequently used to make identification on the source information of the ENF signal of interest. Fig. 3 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed approach with each step being detailed in the following sessions. 
A. Extracting Location-Sensitive Signatures
To identify the source information of ENF traces, the location-sensitive signatures embedded in the ENF signals are extracted by using a variety of advanced signal processing techniques, including statistical measures, wavelet-based signal decomposition as well as autoregressive (AR) model.
(1) Signatures from statistical measures
The first group of the location-dependent signatures are derived from the statistical nature of the ENF signals. Three statistical measures, i.e., mean value, standard deviation and the variation range of the ENF traces are employed as three candidate features. Considering the frequency of the power system usually remains stable at 60Hz in North America and the frequency variation magnitude is quite small, the standard deviation and variation range values are processed through a logarithmic operator, which aims to focus on the order of their variation magnitude and potentially improve the identificability among other signatures.
(2) Signatures from wavelet-based signal decomposition
The second group of spatial signatures focuses on the inner non-stationarity and nonlinearity nature of the ENF signals. Specifically, wavelet-based signal transformation is performed to extract a number of intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) ranging from the highest to the lowest frequencies scales of the ENF recordings. Each IMF is generated based on convolution between the original signal and the selected mother wavelets. The original ENF segment is transformed through seven-level wavelet decomposition [16] , using db1 function as mother wavelet. Based on the IMF at each level (IMF1-IMF7), an approximation signal can be reconstructed by taking the reverse wavelet transformation. Subsequently, the residue between the original signal and the reconstructed signal can be derived. Fig. 4 shows an example of wavelet based signal decomposition. At each level, the variance (log 978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE value) of the IMF is calculated to reveal the difference in the subtle variation of each decomposed signal. In addition, the variation (log value) of the residue signal after the wavelet approximation is also computed as the candidate feature. Considering the industrialization level (generation or load center) of the measurement locations is different from region to region, the energy coefficients (ratio of power) [17] of seven IMF signals and the residue signal after the wavelet approximation are also included as the indicative features. 
B. Random Forest Classification (RFC)
All extracted location-specific features are integrated into RFC to separate the source of ENF signals. RFC is an ensemble of decision trees trained by bootstrap sampling and random feature selection [14] . It aims to generate a large collection of decision trees, and average the output of each tree in order to minimize the variance of the classification results and improve the performance of the final model. , and the corresponding
, at each time, RFC first uses bootstrap technique to draw a set of samples with size M from the training dataset, then a decision tree ˆi T is established based on the bootstrapped samples, by recursively repeating the following procedures for each terminal node of the tree, until the minimum node size is reached [14] . Such iterative procedures are repeated for K times and the final output (label) of the sample is determined by using majority voting strategy (calculating probability of a sample belonging to each class) from all decision trees.
IV. CASE STUDY FOR SOURCE AUTHENTICATION

A. Numeric Experiment Configuration
In this session, the described methodology is applied to recognize the source location of power ENF traces recorded 978-1-5386-3443-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE within a distribution system of WECC. Three numeric experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the described authentication framework, including identification of ENF traces from (1) 10 intra-grid locations within the WECC; (2) distant "out of region" locations and (3) close "out of region" locations.
For each experiment, the source authentication of ENF traces is performed through the following procedures: (1) The data pool consisting of location-sensitive signatures extracted from tens of thousands ENF frames is initially split into a training and testing datasets by using the sample ratio of 60% and 40%. (2) Multi-fold cross-validation is conducted by using the training samples to search the optimal configuration of the RFC classifier, including the size of the forest (K) and the dimension of the randomly selected features (D). (3) After finding the optimal configuration of RFC, it is trained by using the whole training samples. (4) The trained RFC classifier is applied to make a classification on the source location of testing ENF examples. Four measures, i.e., identification rate, precision rate, recall rate and F1-score of testing ENF samples are computed as performance evaluation metrics. TABLE II shows the sample configuration of the above three experiments. 
B. Case Study 1: ENF Traces from 10 Locations within the WECC
In case study 1, the ENF segments in both training and testing dataset are all collected from the ten locations (W1 to W10 in Fig. 2 ) within the WECC. TABLE III presents the evaluation results of the described source identification method. From TABLE III it is observed that the recall rate of testing ENF samples attains 100%, and the overall identification rate also falls in the high range above 97%, which has demonstrated the effectiveness of the described approach. However, the precision rate in TABLE III is relatively low, about 90%. Such low precision rate could be attributed to the high similarity of the variations in the measured ENF signals among multiple locations within a local grid, where the mean value and variance of ENF signals could be almost identical. In addition, minimal differences would be observed in the variance of the decomposed IMFs through the wavelet transformation, thereby reducing the precision rate of the identification results. 
C. Case Study 2: ENF Traces from Distant "Out of Region" Locations
Different from case study 1 where all ENF segments are all from ten pre-known locations (W1-W10), this case study simulates a complicated scenario where part of ENF samples in the testing database are originated from "out of region" locations, i.e., locations which are not included in the training dataset. Specifically, ENF samples recorded at ten locations (W1 -W10) in case study 1 are used to construct the training dataset while the original testing dataset in case study 1 has been updated by incorporating a large number of ENF segments from ORL1 in Fig. 2, thereby generating 11 classes in the testing dataset.
As mentioned in Section III-B, for each testing example, the RFC provides a probability giving its confidence in its decision on the source of recording. By making use of the feature of RFC, we set a confidence threshold (Th) to make a final decision on the source location of the ENF sample, i.e., if the confidence probability of an ENF example assigned by RFC is lower than the selected threshold Th, we advance this example as the "out of region" class. Fig. 6 describes the correlation between the identification rate and Th by using the described methodology. It is observed that there is a "trade off" on the identification rate between the "out of region" class (blue curve) and the remaining ten classes (purple curve). Near-perfect identification rate of the "out of region" class can be attained by using high confidence threshold, while the overall identification rate of the rest ten classes will decline slightly.
By tracking the overall identification rate (black curve) of all classes, an optimal confidence threshold is empirically selected as 0.8 when the peak value of the overall identification rate can be attained. TABLE IV presents the evaluation results of the proposed approach with the optimal threshold of 0.8. It shows that the described method achieves a high identification rate (up to 96%) of ENF examples in the "out of region" class. The maximum overall identification rate is above 95%.
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D. Case Study 3: ENF Traces from Close "Out of Region" Locations
Similar to case study 2, in this scenario, we collect ENF frames at one close "out of region" location (ORL2 in Fig. 2 ) and put them into the testing database in case study 1 to generate the "out of region" class. Fig. 7 presents the correlation between the identification rate of ENF frames from the "out of region" class and Th by using the described method. By comparing Fig. 7 with Fig. 6 it is observed that the identification rate of ENF examples in "out of region" class declines when the threshold is less than 0.8. This is due to the close distance between ORL2 and W10 (less than 10 miles), which results in high similarity in the control strategies and power resources between these two locations. The values of location-dependent signatures at ORL2 exhibit the most overlap with the feature values from W10, which would negatively affect the identification rate of ENF frames from ORL2 that become mistaken to be from W10. By observing the overall identification rate (black curve) in Fig.  7 , a high threshold 0.85 is desired to attain a high identification rate of the ENF examples from the "out of region" class. TABLE V shows the evaluation results of the proposed approach using 0.85 threshold. It shows the recall rate of the testing ENF samples can be maintained above 93%. However, the F1 score experiences a notable drop from 88% to 74%. This indicates minimal differences in the feature values of the ENF traces have confused the RFC when determining the class boundaries and could result in more mistakes in the source identification. Raising the reporting rate or increasing the length of ENF segments could be possible solutions to further improve the identification rate of ENF examples from close "out of region" locations.
Identification Rate (%) Fig. 7 Correlation between Th and identification rate of ENF frames from close ORL2. V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK This paper develops a computational intelligence-based framework to authenticate the source information of ENF signals from synchrophasor measurements. By leveraging advanced signal processing techniques, the underlying location-sensitive signatures of ENF signals measured at different intra-grid locations within the WECC have been revealed. The high accuracy and practicability of the proposed authentication methodology have been firmly validated by extensive case studies on ENF signals collected from FNET/GridEye. The experimental results demonstrate that the distance among measurement locations and the quality of input frequency signals have a great influence on the identification accuracy. A confidence probability threshold above 0.8 is preferred for the RFC to achieve a desirable identification rate given ENF signals are recorded at 10 Hz sampling rate. A higher threshold is required by the RFC in order to recognize the ENF examples from multiple near range locations. The findings in the presented work would provide substantial benefits to system operators and service providers to develop sophisticated measurement authentication strategies and enhance the cyber security of power systems.
There is much future work to do in this new area. Here, we highlight a few prospective directions of this research.
(1) The fundamental of the proposed measurement source authentication method is the uniqueness of spatial signatures captured by the ENF signals. One important fact that needs to be ensured is that whether these features are stable along the time. In addition, the influence of grid topology and operation condition of power system on the extracted spatial signatures needs to be further explored.
(2) The real-time detection of data spoofing against PMUs is a highly time-sensitive task. The computational performance of the proposed approach requires further investigation to ensure that it is capable of meeting the requirements of real-time source authentication application.
